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1. Rule 3(a) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court 
confers jurisdiction on this Court to hear this appeal. 
2. This appeal is from a final order of the Second 
Judicial District Court in and for Davis County, State of 
Utah, the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby presiding, dismissing 
the Heidlebaughs1 action for civil rights violations on the 
basis of that court's determination that the dismissal of the 
first action was res judicata, on the merits, and with preju-
dice. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the district court committed reversible 
error in dismissing the instant action (hereinafter sometimes 
referred to as "the second action"); 
2. Whether the district court committed reversible 
error in determining that Appellants had not, in a prior, 
virtually identical, action (hereinafter sometimes referred to 
as "the first action"), voluntarily agreed to dismiss their 
Complaint in that action; 
3. Whether the district court committed reversible 
error in failing to determine that Rule 41(a) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure was controlling; and 
4. Whether the district court committed reversible 
error in determining that the dismissal of the first action 
was pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, was res judicata, and operated as an adjudication upon 
the merits. 
PERTINENT RULE AND STATUTE 
The pertinent provisions of Rule 41(a) and (b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are the following: 
(a) Voluntary dismissal; effect thereof. 
(1) By plaintiff; by stipulation- Subject 
to the provisions of Rule 23(c), of Rule 66, 
and of any applicable statute, an action may 
be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of 
court ... (ii) by filing a stipulation of 
dismissal signed by all parties who have 
appeared in the action. Unless otherwise 
stated in the notice of dismissal or stipula-
tion, the dismissal is without prejudice ... 
(2) By order of court. Except as provided 
in Paragraph (1) of this subdivision of this 
rule, an action shall not be dismissed at the 
plaintiff's instance save upon order of the 
court and upon such terms and conditions as 
the court deems proper.... Unless otherwise 
specified in the order, a dismissal under this 
paragraph is without prejudice. 
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(b) Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof. 
For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or 
to comply with these rules or any order of 
court, a defendant may move for dismissal of 
an action or of any claim against him...• 
Unless the court in its order for dismissal 
otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this 
subdivision and any dismissal not provided for 
in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack 
of jurisdiction or for improper venue or for 
lack of an indispensable party, operates as an 
adjudication upon the merits. 
The only statute relevant to this appeal, Utah Code Ann. 
§78-12-40, provides: 
If any action is commenced within due time 
and a judgment thereon for the plaintiff is 
reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in such 
action or upon a cause of action otherwise 
than upon the merits, and the time limited 
either by law or contract for commencing the 
same shall have expired, the plaintiff, or if 
he dies and the cause of action survives, his 
representatives, may commence a new action 
within one year after the reversal or failure. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Mr. and Mrs. Heidlebaugh request that this Court reverse 
the district court's dismissal of the second action and rejnand 
this case to that court, with instructions to allow the under-
lying dispute to go forward and be determined on its merits. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Mr. and Mrs. Heidlebaugh appeal from the final order of 
the district court, which order dismissed, with prejudice, the 
second action. 
In 1985, the Heidlebaughs brought the first action 
against the Respondents, alleging civil rights violations. 
Respondents noticed the deposition of Mr. Heidlebaugh. He did 
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not appear. In lieu of proceeding to hearing on Respondents1 
motion to compel the deposition or, in the alternative, to 
dismiss the action, counsel for the parties reached a stipula-
tion to the effect that the Heidlebaughs would appear for 
depositions on a date certain (January 5, 1987), and that, if 
they did not appear, the action would be dismissed. The 
Heidlebaughs did not appear for their depositions, and the 
district court entered its order of dismissal, to which Appel-
lants1 counsel in that action (not their present counsel) had 
theretofore indicated his approval, and which did not express-
ly state whether the dismissal was "with prejudice" or "with-
out prejudice." 
Pursuant to the saving statute, Utah Code Ann. §78-12-40, 
Appellants filed a new Complaint (the second action) against 
Respondents, asserting virtually identical claims. The dis-
trict court concluded, in the second action, that the dis-
missal of the first action operated as an adjudication upon 
the merits of the dispute and that, therefore, the Heidle-
baughs were barred from bringing the second action. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Mr. and Mrs. Heidlebaugh respectfully submit that the 
following is a statement of undisputed facts material to the 
disposition of this appeal: 
1. On November 22, 1985, the same Plaintiffs herein 
sued the same Defendants herein on allegations of civil rights 
violations substantially identical to those which are set 
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forth in the Complaint in the second action. (R. at 2-3, 7, 
68, 71). 
2. In that first action, the Defendants (Respondents 
herein) filed, on or about June 17, 1986, a notice of the 
deposition of Robert Heidlebaugh on August 18, 1986. (R. at 
22, 68 and 71). 
3. That deposition was subsequently continued by stipu-
lation of counsel to September 9, 1986. (Id.). 
4. Robert Heidlebaugh did not appear for his deposi-
tion. (Id.) . 
5. On November 4, 1986, Respondents moved the district 
court to compel the Heidlebaughs to appear for their deposi-
tions or, in the alternative, to dismiss the action. (R. at 
13, 21-23, 68 and 71). 
6. On December 16, 1986, counsel for the parties 
reached a stipulation, which required the Heidlebaughs to 
appear for their depositions on January 5, 1987, or their Com-
plaint would be dismissed. (R. at 13, 27-29, 68, 71). 
7. The Heidlebaughs did not appear for their deposi-
tions on January 5, 1987.X (R. at 14, 32-33, 68, 71). 
1. There is a dispute, not relevant to this action, between 
the Heidlebaughs and their prior counsel, on whether the 
Heidlebaughs were in fact notified of any of the deposi-
tion dates. The district court made no finding with 
respect to that question. (R. at 71-72). 
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8. On February 10, 1987, the district court entered its 
Order of Dismissal, to which the Heidlebaughsf counsel in that 
action had signed his approval, and which did not expressly 
state whether the dismissal was "with prejudice" or "without 
prejudice." (R. at 14, 32-33, 68-69, 71). 
9. No previous order had been entered by the district 
court, in that first action, compelling either Mr. Heidlebaugh 
or Mrs. Heidlebaugh to appear for deposition. (R. at 27-29, 
32) . 
10. In the second action, the district court concluded 
that the dismissal of the first action was entered because 
Robert Heidlebaugh did not make himself available for a depo-
sition in the first action and that, therefore, the dismissal 
of the Complaint in that action had been for cause. (R. at 
68-72). 
11. The district court concluded, in the second action, 
that the dismissal of the first action operated as an adjudi-
cation upon the merits of the dispute under Utah R. Civ. P. 
4Kb) and that, therefore, the Heidlebaughs could not rely on 
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-40, the saving statute, to file a second 
action, even though the second action was filed in timely 
fashion pursuant to that statute (on February 10, 1988). 
(Id.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Heidlebaughs' pursuit of this appeal is based on 
their contention that the district court clearly erred in 
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determining that the dismissal of the original action was an 
involuntary dismissal and an adjudication on the merits pursu-
ant to Rule 41(b), Utah R. Civ* P. As a matter of law, the 
stipulation entered into between the Heidlebaughs' prior coun-
sel and the Defendants1 counsel operated as a stipulation for 
dismissal conditioned upon the Heidlebaughs1 not attending 
their depositions at the specified time. When the Heidle-
baughs did not appear for their depositions, Respondents' 
counsel submitted, with the stipulation, an Order, approved as 
to form by the Heidlebaughs1 prior counsel, dismissing the 
action. The district court entered the Order. 
Because the Order of Dismissal did not state that it was 
"with prejudice," the dismissal was, under Rule 41(a), without 
prejudice. The Heidlebaughs were thus entitled to bring a new 
action under Utah Code Ann. §78-12-40. They did so, in a 
timely fashion, on February 10, 1988, and they should be 
allowed to have their case heard on the merits. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANTS AGREED TO DISMISS THEIR COMPLAINT 
BY STIPULATION, AND THAT CONSTITUTES A VOLUNTARY 
DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE UNDER RULE 41(a) 
OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
As stated hereinabove, the Heidlebaughs1 prior counsel 
agreed by stipulation to dismiss their action if they failed 
to appear for their depositions scheduled for January 5, 1987. 
By the terms of the stipulation, the Heidlebaughs agreed that 
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"if the plaintiffs fail to appear at that time and place, that 
the plaintiffs agree that the court will dismiss their com-
plaint filed herein." (R. at 27). The deposition did not go 
forward on the stated date, and the court subsequently entered 
an Order submitted by Defendants' counsel and approved as to 
form by the Heidlebaughsf prior counsel. That Order stated as 
follows: 
Based upon the previously submitted stipula-
tion of counsel that the plaintiffs would 
appear for their depositions at 10:00 a.m. on 
January 5, 1987, the defendants' counsel of 
record having submitted a notice of said 
depositions, and it being represented to the 
court that the plaintiffs did not appear at 
the above stated time and place, that based 
upon the foregoing stipulation that this 
matter would be dismissed, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the plaintiffs' com-
plaint is hereby dismissed. 
(R. at 32-33) (emphasis added). 
Rule 41(a)(1)(ii), Utah R. Civ. P., provides that an 
action may be voluntarily dismissed "by the plaintiff without 
order of the court ... by filing a stipulation of dismissal 
signed by all parties who have appeared in the action. Unless 
otherwise stated in the notice of dismissal or stipulation, 
the dismissal is without prejudice...." Because neither the 
stipulation nor the subsequent order of the court, entered 
pursuant to the stipulation, indicates whether the dismissal 
was with or without prejudice, under Rule 41(a), the dismissal 
was without prejudice. 
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Since this rule was fashioned after Rule 41, Fed. R. Civ* 
P., "we look freely to federal cases decided under this rule 
in determining its scope and meaning." Madsen v. Borthwick, 
97 Utah Adv. Rep. 13, 18 n. 4 (Dec. 12, 1988) 
Numerous federal decisions have held that if a court 
order is entered upon the stipulation of the parties, unless 
the stipulation specifies otherwise, the dismissal is without 
prejudice. E.g., McKenzie v. Davenport-Harris Funeral Home, 
843 F.2d 930, 934-935 (11th Cir. 1987); Poloron Products, Inc. 
v. Lybrand Ross Bros. & Montgomery, 534 F.2d 1012, 1017 (2nd 
Cir. 1976) (court held voluntary-dismissal stipulation in 
first case was without prejudice and that defendants could 
have included the words "with prejudice" if they so intended). 
Entry of a stipulation for dismissal is automatically effec-
tive and does not require court approval. First Natyl Bank of 
Toms River, N.J, v. Marina City, Inc., 411 F.2d 674, 677 (3rd 
Cir. 1969). 
A stipulation for dismissal, although not formally writ-
ten or signed, still constitutes a voluntary dismissal. Pipe-
liners Local Union No. 798, Tulsa, Okl. v. Ellerd, 503 F.2d 
1193, 1199 (10th Cir. 1974) (court held stipulation in open 
court by counsel for parties for dismissal of action upon 
which court entered an order of dismissal constituted a volun-
tary dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P., Rule 41(a)); Oswalt v. 
Scripto, Inc., 616 F.2d 191, 195 (5th Cir. 1980) (court held 
an oral dismissal of claims during the course of the trial was 
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sufficient to constitute a dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1) even 
though there was no formal dismissal or stipulation filed with 
the clerk). In Oswalt, the court further stated "to require 
the filing of a formal document would be to countenance a 
mechanistic view of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 
exalt form over substance." Idl. at 195. These cases have 
held, in essence, that when a stipulation for dismissal is 
filed, the court's entry of an order effectuating the stipula-
tion for dismissal does not convert a Rule 41(a)(1) dismissal 
to a Rule 41(a)(2) or Rule 4Kb) dismissal. If this Court 
should determine, contrary to the foregoing analysis, that 
Rule 41(a)(1) does not apply, either because the stipulation 
was not signed, or because an order was in fact entered there-
on, then Rule 41(a)(2) would apply. That Rule provides, in 
pertinent part: 
Except as provided in paragraph (1) of this 
subdivision of this rule, an action shall not 
be dismissed at the plaintiffs1 instance, save 
upon order of the court and upon such terms 
and conditions as the court deems proper ... 
unless otherwise specified in the order, a 
dismissal under this paragraph is without 
prejudice. 
In the first action, the order of dismissal was made pur-
suant to the parties1 stipulation, and should therefore be 
determined to have been, for purposes pertinent to this 
appeal, at the Heidlebaughsf "instance." And, because the 
Order did not specify whether the dismissal was with or with-
out prejudice, the dismissal was, by the clear language of the 
Rule, without prejudice. 
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Finally, although an attorney is empowered to stipulate 
to dismissal without prejudice, he or she has no such implied 
authority to dismiss an action with prejudice. Engelhardt v. 
Bell & Howell Co,, 299 F.2d 480, 483-484 (8th Cir. 1962). 
Without the consent of the Heidlebaughs, their prior counsel 
did not have the authority and was not empowered to stipulate 
to a dismissal with prejudice, but only to one without prej-
udice. There is nothing in the record to indicate that such 
authority had been given, and this Court may take judicial 
notice of the fact that the Heidlebaughs have filed a lawsuit 
against their former counsel alleging negligence in his han-
dling of their claims against Respondents, and that they have, 
in that lawsuit, alleged, among other things, that the stipu-
lation for dismissal of the first action was improper. Civil 
No. CV 3295-88; Second District Court of Weber County, State 
of Utah. 
POINT II 
THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL WAS NOT MADE 
PURSUANT TO RULE 4Kb) OF THE 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, NOR 
WAS IT MADE UPON THE MERITS 
Rule 41(b) provides that a defendant may move for dis-
missal of an action for failure of the plaintiff to prosecute 
or to comply with any rule or order of the court. That rule 
further provides: 
Unless the court in its order for dismissal 
otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this 
subdivision and any dismissal not provided for 
in this rule, other than a dismissal for lack 
of jurisdiction or for improper venue or for 
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lack of an indispensable party, operates as an 
adjudication upon the merits. 
In the first action, there was no finding that the 
Heidlebaughs failed to prosecute or to comply with any court 
order or rule. The court did not order them to appear at 
depositions, nor did the court order that if they did not 
appear for their depositions, the matter would be dismissed. 
The court did not find, in its Order of Dismissal or else-
where, that the Heidlebaughs violated any court rule or order. 
Finally, the Heidlebaughs did not have the opportunity to re-
spond in any hearing with respect to the supposed involuntary 
dismissal. The court was never even asked to rule on anything 
in dispute. 
Nor was the first dismissal on the merits under the 
"catchall" provision of the last sentence of Rule 41(b), which 
states that "any dismissal not provided for in this rule" is 
"an adjudication on the merits." In Madsen, this Court held 
that a non-specific dismissal for "failure to state a claim 
upon which relief could be granted," while not expressly 
entered pursuant to Rule 4Kb), was governed by the catchall 
last sentence of Rule 4Kb). 97 Utah Adv. Rep. 13, 15. This 
Court held that the failure to give statutory notice came 
within the "lack of jurisdiction" exception and that, there-
fore, the second action should not have been dismissed. Id. 
Although the non-disputed first dismissal in the case at 
hand does not fall within one of the three Rule 4Kb) excep-
tions mentioned in Madsen, that fact is insignificant when it 
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is understood that that dismissal was voluntary in nature, was 
governed by Rule 41(a), and was, in the rubric of the last 
sentence of Rule 4Kb), a "dismissal pro\ ided for in this 
rule...." See, e.g., Quealy v. Sullivan, 42 Utah 565, 132 
Pac. 4 (1913). 
The dismissal of the first action wes not a dismissal 
based upon the merits. By specifying in its order that the 
dismissal was made pursuant to the parties1 stipulation and by 
reason of the Heidlebaughs' failure to appear for the deposi-
tions, "the court," in Rule 4Kb) languaoe, "in its order for 
dismissal or otherwise" specified that the dismissal was not 
an "adjudication upon the merits." See, Lohman v. General Am. 
Life Ins. Co., 478 F.2d 719, 722 (8th Cir. 1973). There the 
court held the trial court's "order for dismissal did 'other-
wise specify' [under Rule 41(b)] by finding the plaintiff had 
failed t> comply with the court's order to compel plaintiff to 
answer interrogatories." Id. at 722. 
Furthermore, the general policy is to adjudicate cases on 
their merits. Poloron Prod. Inc., 534 F.2d at 1017 (quoting 
the U. S. Supreme Court: "The basic purpose of the Federal 
Rules is to administer justice through fcir trials, not 
through summary dismissals...." Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels 
Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 373, 86 S.Ct. 845, £51, 15 L.Ed.2d 807, 
814 (1966)). 
The Utah Supreme Court noted this general policy, stat-
ing: 
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Dismissal with prejudice under Rule 41(b) is a 
harsh and permanent remedy when it precludes 
presentation of a plaintiff's claim on the 
merits. Our rules of procedure are intended 
to encourage the adjudication of disputes on 
their merits. 
Bonneville Tower Condo. Mgmt. Comm. v. Thompson-Michie 
Assoc., Inc., 728 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah 1988) (the Court held 
that since the trial court did not consider the merits of 
plaintiff's clcLm, there was no reason for the Court to dis-
miss with preji3ice and prevent future consideration of claims 
for failure to join an indispensable party.) 
There is e distinct trend in federal courts against 
granting dismissals with prejudice based upon violation of 
court rules or orders. Such remedies should be granted only 
in extreme cases. Syracuse Broadcasting Corp. v. Newhouse, 
271 F.2d 910, S14 (2nd Cir. 1959). And, where a dismissal 
comes about by reason of the attorney's fault, as may be the 
case here, drastic penalties or sanctions such as dismissal 
without prejudice should not be imposed upon the client. See, 
e.g., Flaska v. Little River Marine Constr. Co., 389 F.2d 885, 
888-889 (5th Cir. 1968), cert, denied, 392 U.S. 928. 
Because Appellants' prior action was dismissed without 
prejudice and cid not act as a judgment on the merits, Plain-
tiffs' Complairt in the second action was filed in timely 
fashion under t tah Code Ann. §78-12-40 and should not have 
been dismissed. Madsen, 97 Utah Adv. Rpt. at 18 (plaintiffs 
were not time-tarred since second action was filed within one 
year after the court dismissed first action). Quealy, 132 
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Pac. 4; Williams v. Nelson, 45 Utah 255, 145 P.2d 39 (1914) 
(this Court held that where a non-suit is granted, the action 
does not fail upon the merits, and the reason for which the 
non-suit was granted is immaterial). In Quealy, this Court 
stated that a judgment is not on the merits within the meaning 
of Rule 41(b) when the case is dismissed on plaintiff's 
motion; therefore, an action brought within one year after 
such a dismissal was not barred by the statute of limitations, 
132 Pac. 4. Because Plaintiffs1 second Complaint was filed on 
February 10, 1988, exactly one year after the prior action was 
dismissed, Plaintiffs1 second cause of action was timely and 
should not have been dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
The first action was voluntarily dismissed pursuant to 
Rule 41(a). Because the Order of Dismissal was pursuant to a 
stipulation by the parties and was silent on the issue of 
whether the action was dismissed with or without prejudice, 
the~ action was dismissed without prejudice, by reason of the 
clear language of Rule 41(a). Utah Code Ann. §78-12-40 
allows a plaintiff to commence a new action within one year 
after failure upon a cause of action otherwise than upon the 
merits. Because the Heidlebaughs commenced the second action 
within one year of the voluntary dismissal of the first 
action, the district court's Order of Dismissal of the second 
action was in error and should be reversed. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 27th day of January, 1989. 
WINDER \ HASLAM 
Peter C. Collins 
Tamara K. Prince 
Attorneys for Appellants 
Peter C. Collins 
Tamara K. Prince 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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LEROY WEBB, PAUL NELSON and 
CLINTON CITY, 
Defendants. 
STIPULATION AND ORDER 
Civil No.: 38432 
The plaintiffs, by and through their counsel of 
record, John Caine and defendants, by and through their 
counsel of record Robert G. Gilchrist, hereby stipulate and 
agree that based upon the plaintiffs• attorney representation 
that he has located his clients, it is hereby stipulated that 
he will produce them for their depositions at his office on 
January 5, 1987, and if the plaintiffs fail to appear at that 
time and place that the plaintiffs agree that the court will 
dismiss their complaint filed herein. 
-i-
DATED this day of , 1986. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
ROBERT G. GILCHRIST 
Attorneys for Defendants 
RICHARDS, CAINE AND RICHARDS 
JOHN T. CAINE 




Based upon the foregoing stipulation of counsel, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that plaintiffs will appear at 
their attorneys' office on January 5, 1987, at 10:00 a.m. for 
their depositions, and if they fail to appear at that time that 
upon notice to the court, that this matter will be dismissed. 
DATED this day of , 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
THE HONORABLE DOUGLAS J . CORNABY 
Distr ic t Court Judge 
HEIDLEB2/RGG 
JW12176 
- i i i 
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GARY D. STOTT 
ROBERT G. GILCHRIST 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
Attorneys for Defendants 
CSB Tower, Suite 700 
50 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: (801) 531-1777 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT HEIDLEBAUGH and GRETTA 








Civil No.: 38432 
Based upon the previously submitted stipulation of 
counsel that the plaintiffs would appear for their depositions 
at 10:00 a.m. on January 5, 1987, and the defendants' counsel 
of record having submitted a notice of said depositions, and 
it being represented to the court that the plaintiffs did not 
appear at the above stated time and place, that based upon the 
foregoing stipulation that this matter would be dismissed, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the plaintiffs' complaint 
is hereby dismissed. 
-iv— 
DATED this ML day of 
Approved* as to Form: 
JOHN/CAINS 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
hJjj-eJr 
J— 1987 . 
BY THE COURT: 
DOUGLAS L CORNABY 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
THE HONORABLE DOUGLAS J. CORNABY 
District Court Judge 
.T G. GILCHRIST 
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In the Second Judicial District Court
 CL::v.»:.: - '
 : : j?J 
in and for the ^ 
County of Davis, State of Utah BV ^flrTEi^ 
ROBERT HEIDLEBAUGH, et al.; ] 
Plaintiffs, ] 
vs. ] 
LEROY WEBB, et al., ] 
Defendants. ] 
RULING ON MOTION 
I TO DISMISS 
• Civil No. 42977 
The defendants' motion to dismiss came before the court for 
oral argument on August 2, 1988, with Peter C. Collins appearing 
for the plaintiffs and Robert G. Gilchrist appearing for the 
defendants. After oral argument, the court took the motion under 
advisement. The court now rules on the motion. 
The motion to dismiss is granted. 
The issue before this court is whether or not the prior 
action is res judicatta. 
On November 22, 1985, the same plaintiffs sued the same 
defendants on identical allegations as contained herein. That 
file was number 38432. In that action the defendants notified 
the plaintiffs on June 17, 1986, that the deposition of Robert 
Heidlebaugh would be taken on August 13, 1986. This was 
continued to September 9, 1986. The plaintiffs attorney could 
not produce his client for a deposition. On November 4, 1986, 
the defendants moved to compel the deposition or dismiss the 
action. On December 16, 1986, counsel for all parties reached a 
stipulation, to-wit, plaintiff, Robert Heidlebaugh would appear 
for deposition on January 5, 1987, or the plaintiffs' action 
would be dismissed. The deposition was not taken. On February 
-vi-
10, 1987, the court signed the order of dismissal* The order 
does not specify that the dismissal is with prejudice or without 
prejudice. Rule 41(b) provides: 
"Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise 
specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any 
dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a 
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue or 
for lack of an indispensable party, operates as an 
adjudication upon the merits." 
This is so notwithstanding the provisions of Rule 41(a)(1). The 
plaintiff's attorney stipulated to the dismissal only because he 
could not produce his client for a deposition even though he had 
from June, 1986, to January, 1987 to do so. The dismissal was 
granted because the plaintiff would not make himself available 
for a deposition. This was a dismissal for cause. It operated 
as "an adjudication upon the merits." 
Under the view stated above the plaintiffs are not entitled 
to the benefits of Utah Code 78-12-40 which is the saving 
statute. 
The defendants are ordered to draw a formal order consistent 
with this order. 
Dated August 4, 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
Certificate of Mailing: 
This is to certify that the undersigned mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Ruling to Peter C. Collins, P. 0. 
Box 2668, Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668 and Robert G. 
Gilchrist, P. 0. Box 2465, Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 on August 
4, 1988.
 y y 
Deputy Clerk 
-vii-
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ROBERT G. GILCHRIST 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER CL:.V..l .- 1 .'. :C-37 
& NELSON 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Key Bank Tower, Suite 700 
50 South Main Street 
Post Office Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: (801) 531-1777 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT HEIDLEBAUGH, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
-v-
LEROY WEBB, et al. , 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 42977 
The defendants' motion to dismiss having come on for 
hearing before the court on August 2, 1988, with the plaintiffs 
being represented by counsel of record Peter C. Collins, and 
defendants being represented by counsel of record Robert G. 
Gilchrist, and the court having heard argument, and having 
reviewed the file 
THAT IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that defendants1 motion i* 




1. On November 22, 1985, the same plaintiffs herein 
sued the same defendants herein on allegations virtually iden-
tical to those set forth in this action. 
2. In that action, Civil Number 38432, the defendants 
submitted, on June 17, 1986, a notice of the deposition of 
Robert Heidlebaugh to be taken on August 13, 1986. 
3. The deposition was subsequently continued by 
notice to September 9, 1986. 
4. Neither plaintiff showed up. 
5. On November 4, 1986, the defendants moved the 
court to compel the deposition or in the alternative to dismiss 
the action. 
6. On December 16, 1986, counsel for the parties 
reached a written stipulation, which required Robert Heidlebaugh 
to appear for a deposition on January 5, 1987, or the plain-
tiffs1 action would be dismissed. 
7. The deposition of Robert Heidlebaugh was not held 
on January 5, 1987. 
8. On February 10, 1987, the court signed an order 
of dismissal, to which plaintiffs1 counsel in that action had 
signed his approval. 
The court concludes that the dismissal was granted 
because the plaintiff Robert Heidlebaugh did not make himself 
available for a deposition (the court makes no finding on the 
question of whether he or plaintiff Joyce Heidlebaugh ever 
-ix-
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received notice of that or any of the other deposition dates), 
and that, therefore, the Complaint was dismissed for cause. A 
dismissal for cause is an adjudication upon the merits. An 
adjudication upon the merits does not entitle the plaintiffs 
to rely on U.C.A. §78-12-40, the saving statute, to file a 
second action, even though such a second action, this action, 
was filed in timely fashion pursuant to that statute. 
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, the court hereby 
orders, adjudges and decrees that the plaintiffs1 Complaint, 
Amended Complaint, and Second Amended Complaint, are all hereby 
dismissed with prejudice, with each party to bear its own costs 
incurred herein. 
DATED this *C day of _..5Cv*V- , 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE DOOGLAS L.'CORNABY 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to form: 
I ^ 
Peter C. Collins 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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